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We might say that today, especially in the United States, we are experiencing
the painful effects of an orthodox faith in economy as universal law, that is, in the
free market as the law of the universe, a cosmology so powerful that it claims
authority over all forms of ethico-political agency, coding citizens as consumers,
life as management, and children as investments. The success of neoliberal visions
of law and economy, or more accurately, law and economics, rests in their coding
of law as model for rational economic practice on the one hand, and on the other
(rather more invisible) hand, the ability to institute that abstract, spectral thing that
we call “the economy” as the natural origin of law itself. If the presupposition of
such approaches to law and economy is that these are distinct spheres and
systems, we might say their telos lies in the hope that one day they will merge and
become one, thus offering a powerful messianic vision of the meeting of desire
(which is thought to motivate all self-interested economic transactions) and law, or
a collapse of choice and coercion, in everyday conventions.
This utopian market vision evokes the imperial prophecy of Thomas
Babington Macaulay, the first law member of the Governor-General’s Council
under the British East India Company and the motivating force for colonial
India’s Law Commissions, which installed its Criminal and Civil Procedure codes.
In an influential speech in Parliament on the Government of India Bill in 1833,
Macaulay argued that it:
would be . . . far better for us that the people of India were well governed
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and independent of us, than ill governed and subject to us; that they were
ruled by their own kings, but wearing our broadcloth, and working with
our cutlery, than that they were performing their salaams to English
magistrates . . . but were too ignorant to value, or too poor to buy,
English manufactures. To trade with civilized men is infinitely more
profitable than to govern savages.1
For utilitarians like Macaulay, the market itself offered the most efficient
form of governing. The colonial civilizing mission—a despotic project of
improvement—would instill in colonial subjects an education in ethical valuation
and the value of market values, the result of which would be that civilized natives
would act out the script of supply and demand to the benefit of England. Seeking
to replace political despotism with free market ethics, Macaulay envisioned a
society made up of market actors whose political agency (being governed by “their
own kings”) would be trumped by their economic instrumentality in favor of
Britain’s profit. It is important here to remember that Macaulay’s vision provided
the impetus for legal standardization in India, a program that sought at once to
implement a rule of law and secure the free circulation of capital through the
disciplines of contract.
A figuration of the continuum across ethics and politics, the colonial subject
as economic agent calls us to unpack a range of questions about economy as a
project of governing—both self and society—and so especially about the
relationship of law and economy. Elaborating on my work on law, culture, and
market governance in colonial India, I gesture here toward a genealogy from
colonial liberalism to contemporary neoliberalism to offer one channel for a “law
as” approach:2 an attention, informed by colonial history and postcolonial studies,
to the techniques of what Foucault has called “la gouvernementalité libérale”
(liberal governmentality) which views “civil society [as] the concrete ensemble
within which . . . abstract points, economic men, need to be positioned in order to be
made adequately manageable.”3 Interested in the political rationalities that enforce
1. THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY, Speech in Parliament on the Government of India Bill, 10 July
1833, in PROSE AND POETRY 716–18 (G.M. Young ed., 1967). The Government of India Act of 1933
extended the authority of Governor-General of the East India Company from control over Company
officials to control over British India.
2. RITU BIRLA, STAGES OF CAPITAL: LAW, CULTURE AND MARKET GOVERNANCE IN LATE
COLONIAL INDIA (2009).
3. Michel Foucault, Lecture at the Collège de France, 4 April 1979, translated by and cited in Colin
Gordon, Governmental Rationality, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT, 23 (Graham Burchell et al. eds., 1991).
The full text of this lecture can be found in MICHEL FOUCAULT, LA NAISSANCE DE LA
BIOPOLITIQUE (Seuil 2004) and in English translation, MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF
BIOPOLITICS: LECTURES AT THE COLLÈGE DE FRANCE, 1978–79 (Picador 2010). The original
French reads: “[L]a société civile, c’est l’ensemble concret à l’intérieur duquel il faut, pour pouvoir les
gérer convenablement, replacer ces points idéaux que constituent les hommes économiques. Donc,
homo economicus et société civile font du même ensemble, c’est l’ensemble de la technologie de la
gouvernementalité libérale.” FOUCAULT, LA NAISSANCE DE LA BIOPOLITIQUE, supra at 300. Foucault
draws attention to a genealogy of neoliberal governance that begins with German ordoliberalism and
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the distinction between what Marx called the “celestial” abstraction of the citizen
and the “terrestrial” self-interested economic subject, such a project begins by
attending to slippages across the classic binaries of state/market, state/civil
society, and public/private, and is informed by and elaborates a wide range of
legal thought, from legal realism, to critical legal studies, to law and society
frameworks.4 Many strands of these approaches have sought to map the dynamic
relationship between law and economy, in the economic motives informing the
workings of law, for example, or in law’s regulation of market imbalances.5 At the
same time, even amid critical approaches, scholarly interest in thinking law and
economy together can nevertheless address them as distinct spheres, operating
broadly via a state/market binary. Such scripts also structure social science
approaches to the study of political economy (that is, the study of the relationship
of the state and market, both conceived as a priori arenas), as well as the field of
law and economics.6 Said differently, in the “law and” formulation, law operates as

the Chicago School of Milton Friedman. A key feature of this genealogy is the shift in the very
concept of the market and its relationship to governance. In the eighteenth century, the market was
conceived as a natural force, constituted by natural principles of exchange, and so distinguished from
the state and governmental intervention. But by the early twentieth century, Foucault argues, various
forms of neoliberalism come to view the free market not as a system of exchange, but rather as a site
of competition, an arena that demands constant governance: In this new vision, “[t]he government
must accompany the market from start to finish. The market economy . . . constitutes the general
index . . . for defining all governmental action.” FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF BIOPOLITICS, supra at
121. Contrary to popular discourses, neoliberalism develops not as an interest in “freeing an empty
space” for the market to operate outside of governmental intervention, but rather in “taking the
formal principles of a market economy and . . . projecting them on to a general art of government.”
FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF BIOPOLITICS, supra at 131. Said differently, the “natural” free market
could only be animated through active and masterful governance. Colonialism in India, with its
implementation of “the market” as a distinct domain of governance, I argue, is a key part of this
genealogy of neoliberalism. For a working definition of neoliberalism through Foucault’s writings in
The Birth of Biopolitics, see Wendy Brown, Neo-liberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy, 7 THEORY &
EVENT 1 (2003).
4. On the division of man into celestial and terrestrial being, see Karl Marx, On the Jewish
Question, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER, 34 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 1978).
5. Perhaps the most influential work in the legal realist mode is MORTON HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860 (1979). It is important to note that there are
aspects of Horwitz’s text that resonate for a Foucauldian reading of law, particularly Foucault’s critical
reading of contract via a “noneconomic analysis of power,” as I discuss below. Christine Desan, for
example, has highlighted Horwitz’s charting of the emergence of a universalized contract doctrine, or,
as I see it, the making of a kind of general equivalence for adjudication. See Christine Desan, Beyond
Commodification: Contract and the Credit-Based World of Modern Capitalism, in TRANSFORMATIONS IN
AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 111–42 (D. W. Hamilton and A. L. Brophy eds., 2010).
6. Literature on law and economic justice, as well as law and development studies,
presupposes the state/market binary—law’s role is to correct the discrepancies and unevenness
produced by market forces—even as it launches activist, social justice-oriented critique. In a different
vein, the now extensive and dominant field of law and economics also views the state’s legal authority
and the market as distinct spheres and logics, but which can be made to work in sync by applying
economic models to legal analysis. This would ensure that law operates on principles of market
efficiency and incentive. The foundational text in this field remains RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW (1973).
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a system or logic, that is, as a logos, as does economy, each as an arena outside the
other.
In contrast, to pose law as economy, I want to emphasize their embeddedness
within each other, reading both robustly through the concept of governing.7 Here,
Foucault’s lectures on liberal and neoliberal governmentality are of particular
value. A term that places analytical focus on the mentalities and practices of
governing, the directing or conducting of conduct, or what he calls the “conduct
of conduct,” governmentality as a historical formation refers specifically to the
rationalities of governing that have developed since the late eighteenth-century
emergence of the discipline of political economy. Attentive to its wide range of
schools from the late eighteenth century, Foucault addresses political economy as
a potent modern arrangement of power directed at managing political subjects as
bodies and populations. Significantly, this vision of governing emerges just as
juridical discourses of sovereignty begin to recode absolute sovereign right as
social contract, that is, as the sovereignty of “the people” and citizenship rights are
established and celebrated.8 Unfortunately, Foucault does not address colonial
formations, especially the colonial liberalism manifest as the improving mission of
British utilitarians, which lay bare political economy’s modern political
rationalities, instituting, as I will highlight here, the market as the name and standin for “the public,” a site of modernity and space distinguished from the private
realm of ancient and anachronistic “native culture.”
This key feature of modern colonialism, the recoding of conquest as
commerce, as opposed to the early modern or ancient territorial conquest for
commerce, is especially important for unpacking the contemporary global coding
of democracy as capitalism, and more broadly, the production of a neoliberal
citizenry that is exactly not a “public,” but as Macaulay envisioned, a mass of
perfectly disciplined consumers.9 Mapping the world financially, such a process
7. Duncan Kennedy’s classic critical-legal-studies mappings of law and economy, which assert
the central place of law in the very conceptualizing of an economic world-view, inform my project of
theorizing embeddedness here. Kennedy’s keen attention to Marx’s reading of the coercions of
contract and Weber’s sociology of law as grounds for critical legal studies is extended here in my
reading of law and liberal/neoliberal governmentality. See Duncan Kennedy, The Role of Law in
Economic Thought: Essays on the Fetishism of Commodities 34 AM. U. L. REV. 939 (1984); see also Duncan
Kennedy, The Disenchantment of Logically Formal Legal Rationality, or Max Weber’s Sociology in the Genealogy of
the Contemporary Mode of Western Legal Thought, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1031 (2004).
8. For the definition of governmentality as a historical formation, see Foucault, Governmentality,
THE FOUCAULT EFFECT, supra note 3, at 87. This essay is one of Foucault’s lectures at the Collège de
France in 1978–1979. See the lectures in LA NAISSANCE DE LA BIOPOLITIQUE (THE BIRTH OF
BIOPOLITICS), supra note 3, in which he elaborates on the conduct of conduct. For the definition of
conduct, see infra, section on the non-economic analysis of power, and MICHEL FOUCAULT,
SÉCURITÉ, TERRITOIRE, POPULATION: COURS AU COLLÈGE DE FRANCE, 1977–78, Lecture 1 March
1978, 196–97 (Seuil/Gallimard 2004). For the English translation, see FOUCAULT, SECURITY,
TERRITORY, POPULATION: LECTURES AT THE COLLÈGE DE FRANCE 193 (Picador 2010).
9. Elaborating on Foucault, as well as Deleuze, Guattari, and others who are in the tradition
of engaging Marx critically, a range of social theorists and philosophers are exploring the techniques
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cuts across the credit-addicted subject of foreclosure in the United States and the
credit-baited subaltern woman, the subject of gender- and development-based
microcredit projects.10 Foucault’s genealogy of governmentality enables textured
readings of the legal dynamics that span such contemporary neoliberal formations
and their precedents in colonial liberalism, even despite the fact that histories of
colonialism constitute a notorious lacuna in Foucault’s writings.11 In this Essay, I
read the nexus of law and governmentality through the lens of a colonial historical
terrain in order to chart an approach to law as economy, one that grounds a
critical postcolonial method for legal history. Such a method moves beyond the
instrumentality of law for identity politics, entailing instead a rigorous attention to
law’s role in the political rationalities and codings of culture that produce and are
legitimized by that modern abstraction we call “the economy.” This approach
demands that we read economic and political liberalism closely alongside each
other, and not only in formerly colonized spaces. Said differently, to read law as
economy brings a presentist method to the legal history of colonialism, one
interested especially in the genealogies and contemporary dynamics of commerce
and conquest. Moreover, such a presentist postcolonial analytic for legal history
supplements important historical work that details the mechanics of law and its
creative deployment by subjects in colonial contexts. Postcolonial scholars must
grapple with the temporalities and spatialities of what Karl Polanyi called
embeddedness, a term which points to socialities that are not fully captured by the
modern abstraction of social relations as exchange-relations, or the recoding and
flattening of deep layers of social meaning into exchange-values.12 That is, a
postcolonial analytic must engage with the embeddedness of law and economy,
and more broadly, with embeddedness as a problem for the abstracting impetus of
both modern law and economy, spheres which in their systematicity and logics of
commensurability erase the densely and temporally situated operations of

and technologies of contemporary neoliberal culture. For a summary of the emergence of discourses
of self-care/moral autonomy, and neoliberal evacuation of the public, see Brown, supra note 3.
10. For a critical reading of gender, development, and microcredit, see GAYATRI
CHAKRAVORTY SPIVAK, A CRITIQUE OF POSTCOLONIAL REASON 312–421 (1999).
11. On Foucault, Foucauldian analysis, and colonialism, see ANN LAURA STOLER, CARNAL
KNOWLEDGE AND IMPERIAL POWER: RACE AND THE INTIMATE IN COLONIAL RULE (2002),
especially chapter 6. See also ANN LAURA STOLER, RACE AND THE EDUCATION OF DESIRE:
FOUCAULT’S HISTORY OF SEXUALITY AND THE COLONIAL ORDER OF THINGS (1995).
12. See generally KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1957). To describe
embedded social relations, Polanyi’s reading evokes a nostalgia for a preindustrial Gemeinschaft, and
deserves a critical eye on that account, for his temporal politics affirm master narratives of
modernization (status to contract, Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft) that have been successfully challenged by
scholars working the economic history of global capitalism, as well as those addressing postcolonial
capitalist modernities. See, e.g., DIPESH CHAKRABARTY, PROVINCIALIZING EUROPE: POSTCOLONIAL
THOUGHT AND HISTORICAL DIFFERENCE (2000); JOHN COMAROFF & JEAN COMAROFF,
ETHNICITY, INC. (2009). Still, the term “embedding” does point to the multiplicities of negotiations
that are hidden, if not erased, when the market, as an abstraction, monopolizes our conception of
social.
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subjectivity, agency and, sociality.13 Posed against the autonomous subject of
rights of both natural and positive legal systems, embeddedness pushes a legal
history that works within the folds of the double meaning of the subject, as in the
term legal subject: the subject with agency, and the subject of (subjected to)
authority.14
I. LAW AS ECONOMY: NOMOS, CONTEXT, AND LIMITS
A robust reading of economy in its classical sense promotes such a project
by challenging the “law and its outside” logic of “law and economy” formulations.
It is important to remember that economy, from the ancient Greek, oikonomia, or
the law/convention (nomos) that distributes, arranges, and so regulates the
household (oikos), is itself a concept of law. Indeed, here a concept of law is
embedded within economy, rendering it a kind of governing indistinguishable from
the inscription of community and sociality itself, and binding a notion of law to
the idea of community making. Economy in this sense provides a lever to open
legal history by foregrounding the concept of law as nomos or convention, which
emphasizes the historicity and textured social habitus of law.15 At its radical
ground, convention is constituted by practices that are temporally and spatially
situated—it can be thought of, I want to argue, as the legal name for
embeddedness—and so poses questions about law, temporality, and ethicopolitical agency that challenge projects of legal systematizing. Thinking law as
economy in this way opens a robust engagement of the relationship between law
as nomos or convention, that is, the situated, located historicity of conduct and
practice and law as logos, that is, as sealed, scripted juridical logic and sovereign
(even divine) performative, as standardizing Benthamite logic and the commands
of sovereignty. To pose law as nomos also foregrounds the problem that
conventions shift and change, marking a historicity that even the most systematic
and totalizing positive law projects confront as an uncatchable currency. As such,

13. A rich historiography is developing on law in colonial contexts, detailing colonial subjects’
deployment of the wide range of legal domains. See, e.g., LAUREN BENTON, A SEARCH FOR
SOVEREIGNTY: LAW AND GEOGRAPHY IN EUROPEAN EMPIRES (2010). For an influential text that
elaborates the legal maneuvers and “jurisdictional jockeying” of colonial subjects, see LAUREN
BENTON, LAW AND COLONIAL CULTURES: LEGAL REGIMES IN WORLD HISTORY (2002). For South
Asian explorations in this vein, see 46 INDIAN ECON. & SOC. HIST. REV. 1 (2009).
14. BIRLA, supra note 2, at 6.
15. For the foundational theorizing of habitus, see PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A
THEORY OF PRACTICE (1979). My definition of nomos as convention emphasizes the historicity and
shifting temporalities of the lived worlds of law. I supplement a classic text that foregrounds the
concept of law as nomos and is an early foundation for critical legal studies: Robert Cover, The Supreme
Court 1984 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983). For Cover, the concept
of law as nomos highlights the robust making of normative worlds, and the “force of normative
commitments,” a reading that opens the analysis of law and power. Id. at 7. Elaborating, I emphasize
the temporal and spatial situatedness of convention to pose an analysis of law from its limits.
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convention carves historical context, and also points to the theoretical
impossibility of context itself. As an ever-present currency that slips codification
and temporizing, nomos marks the limits of law and history, posing the
impossibility of context, even as it marks context through the very inscription
(however ephemeral) of a legal coinage. (Indeed, nomos bears an etymological
relation to the ancient Greek for monetary currency, nomisma.)16
Nomos as an entry point for analysis also revisits an old-fashioned Weberian
formulation directed at problematizing law and agency: economy as a problem of law.
That is, not “the economy” as a problem for law, not economics as a problem for
law, but economy, in its classical sense as practice of arranging, managing, and
governing, as a problem of the relationship of conduct, convention, custom, and
juridical code. Weber’s formal definition of convention—conduct without any
coercion—posits an elusive theoretical limit and so poses questions about formal
legal translations of the norms and currencies of conduct, and more specifically
for our investigations here, about the mechanics of ethico-political agency within
systems of valuation, and forms of community, group, or corporate life not fully
appropriated by the value system of the free market.17 With these challenges in
mind, one obvious task for the “law as” legal historian is to examine law from its
limits, thus investigating its voice of sovereignty through its context-producing
techniques. Here, these are addressed via the techniques by which law disembeds
“the economy” from broader webs of social relations. At the same time, attuned
to these Weberian resonances in Foucault’s analysis of governmentality, and
especially in his call to explore the “conduct of conduct,” the critical legal
historian must seek to situate the agency of the legal subject, moving beyond
identifying legal agency as historical agency tout court.18 The challenge of writing the
legal history of market practice telescopes the broader challenge of how to narrate

16. For the foundational analysis of oikonomia, see ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS (T.A. Sinclair
trans., Penguin Books rev. ed. 1983).
17. For Weber’s definition of convention, see MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, 319
(Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978). If Weber imagines convention as a ground without
coercion in order to explore the coercive character of law, Foucault elaborates via a “noneconomic
analysis of power” by unpacking liberal govermentality’s directing of conduct, and the slippery
relationship between agency and instrumentality that must attend analyses of law and power. See infra,
Part III.
18. Weber is generally understood as contradictory on law, at once mapping the coercive force
of law, and at the same time, recoding this coercive force as the agency of the economic subject, by
coding modern market ethics as the very site where self-interest and the force of law meet. For
Weber, the modern self-interested market actor engages in contractual legal relations exactly because
the protection of property and the regularity of market exchange serves self-interest. See WEBER, supra
note 17, at 336–37. This figuration of the self-interested market actor as the site of law and its
undoing evokes Macaulay, and is further problematized by Foucault in THE BIRTH OF BIOPOLITICS,
supra note 3, through a distinction between the subject of interest and the subject of law/right. For a
reading of Weber and Foucault on the economic subject in this vein, see Ritu Birla, Vernacular
Capitalists and the Modern Subject in India: Law, Cultural Politics and Market Ethics, in ETHICAL LIFE IN
SOUTH ASIA, 83–100 (Anand Pandian & Daud Ali eds., 2010).
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conduct and when it channels the force of law, a problem exposed by the
centuries-long history of discourse on the lex mercatoria or mercantile law, an
elusive legal domain that has recently drawn renewed attention, especially in the
realm of international law.19
In the following sections, I weave three themes that mark the spatial and
temporal dynamics of law as economy: convention, corporation, and currency.
First, I place a summary of the historical context of market governance in late
colonial India alongside Foucault’s call to a “noneconomic analysis” of power to
elaborate a “law as economy” approach and its postcolonial method. Then, I bring
such a reading to two key moments from the codification of market practice in
colonial India—the Indian Companies Act of 1882 and the Negotiable
Instruments Act of 1881, highlighting the production of the market as site for the
social, and the concomitant legal coding of culture; the agency and instrumentality
of the legal subject; law’s temporal politics; and the limits of law itself. 20
II. LAW AND THE TEXT/CONTEXT OF COLONIAL LIBERALISM
The text and context I offer through which to address these themes is the
legal regime of British India in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a
period in which, much like today, a concentrated genesis of legal fictions enabled
an extensive globalization of capital, especially new forms of finance capital. At
this time, colonial legislators and jurists sought to standardize market practice and
installed a new object of sovereign management, that thing called “the market.”
This was an abstract, supralocal space that stood in for “the public” in an arena of
political subjects, rather than citizens; at the same time, its installation negotiated
the situated conventions and practices that structured indigenous, or what I call
vernacular capitalism, that operated through norms of kinship, extended family,
clan, and caste. I present this Indian context not as just as an empirical case study,
as an exotic outside if you will, but rather as a site and citation of the genealogy of
capitalist modernity itself. 21
As I’ve argued more extensively elsewhere, the legal history of colonial India
19. For the recent revitalization of discourse on the lex mercatoria, see Ralph Michaels, The
True Lex Mercatoria: Law Beyond the State, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447 (2007), and Peter
Mazzacano, The Lex Mercatoria as Autonomous Law, 4 COMP. LAW & POL’Y ECON. RESEARCH PAPER
29/2008, 1 (2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1137629, and Nikitas Emmanuel
Hatzimihail, The Many Lives—and Faces—of Lex Mercatoria: History as Genealogy in International Business
Law, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169 (2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1222865.
20. Scholars in postcolonial studies have drawn attention to the limits of law by considering
its gendered/affective limits, and the limits of rights discourses for minority and subaltern subjects.
See, e.g., Dipesh Chakrabarty, The Subject of Law and the Subject of Narrative, in HABITATIONS OF
MODERNITY: ESSAYS IN THE WAKE OF SUBALTERN STUDIES, 101–14 (2002); see also NIVEDITA
MENON, RECOVERING SUBVERSION: FEMINIST POLITICS BEYOND THE LAW (2004); Upendra Baxi,
The State’s Emissary: The Place of Law in Subaltern Studies, in SUBALTERN STUDIES VII (Partha Chatterjee
& Gyanendra Pandley eds., 1992).
21. See BIRLA, supra note 2.
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exposes the role of law in the historical production of that thing we now call “the
economy,” so natural and so real today that we listen for its health every morning
on the news. More specifically, I emphasize that colonial legislation and
jurisprudence installed “the market” as abstract model for all social relations and
as terrain for the making of modern subjects: my term “market governance” refers
to both the production of “the economy” as an object of governance, as well as
the enforcement of “the market” as an ethico-political sovereign with a monopoly
over the very imagining of the social.22 A torrent of new measures directed at the
free circulation of capital emerged in the period immediately after formal legal
codification, especially from about 1880 to 1930, measures that ranged from law
on companies, to negotiable instruments, to income tax, trusts, and charitable
endowments, as well as futures trading and government securities, among others.
A key story in the broader global standardization of contract law in the nineteenth
century, this accelerated colonial process installed new forms of group association
grounded in contractual relations of individual subjects. Reflecting a broader
discussion on corporate or group life as well as the investment in narrating
modernity as a shift from status to contract among legal thinkers of the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries, most famously, Henry Sumner Maine, but also others like
Otto Von Gierke and F.W. Maitland, legislators and judges grappled with forms
of “embedded” social life, perhaps no more exhaustively than in the discourse on
indigenous mercantile norms emerging as colonialism’s economic development
regime took shape.23
Vernacular practitioners of capitalism, who operated through norms of
kinship, and were universally acknowledged engines of credit, production, and
consumption, confronted the establishment of contract as universal instrument
for market exchange. The confrontation exposes the difficulties in translating the
spatial and temporal habitus of market conventions, the ways of organizing
exchange, production, kinship, and trust that sustained the hegemony of
vernacular capitalists, and that British authorities sought to appropriate in the
name of a civilizing mission of “moral and material improvement.” These were
characterized by what I call an extensive negotiability between the symbolic capital of
kinship and the capital flows of commerce and finance; this worldview sat
uncomfortably with that of colonial jurists and legislators, for whom legitimate
market exchange was distinguished by legal procedures of contract and the
ubiquitously reiterated criterion of “general public utility.” Indeed, all new
22. Id. at 22–23.
23. The late nineteenth-century discussion on the status/contract distinction was articulated
most influentially by Henry Sumner Maine in ANCIENT LAW 170 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1931 ed.), but
its resonances can be found more broadly in the discussions about Gemeinschaft and Gesesellschaft in
thinkers such as Karl Marx, Ferdinand Tönnies, who coined the distinction, Max Weber, and F.W.
Maitland. See FERDINAND TÖNNIES, COMMUNITY AND CIVIL SOCIETY (1887); WEBER, supra note
17; F.W. MAITLAND, STATE, TRUST AND CORPORATION (David Runicman & Magnus Ryan, eds.,
2003).
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measures were enacted with this call.
The categories of political liberalism, that is, the distinction between public
and private, infiltrated commercial and financial law in India in the nineteenth
century, distinguishing between two general forms of group life, a public of
market actors, and a so-called “private” world of indigenous culture and religion,
which was to be regulated by the Hindu or Muslim personal law that had also
been largely standardized by the 1860s. It is important to remember here that in
1858, after being shaken by the rebellions of 1857, the British Crown officially
replaced the East India Company, pronouncing a policy of noninterference with
indigenous culture, a project enforced through an investment in legal pluralism
with the codification and strict application of the regime of personal law.
As such, the public/private distinction, I have argued, was mapped as an
economy/culture distinction, and sat asymmetrically over local socialities,
including the embedded world of the bazaar, run by vernacular firms whose
extensive kinship networks were as public in their import as they were private in
their selective constitution. I highlight this awkward legal framing not to celebrate
a “native” worldview, but rather to chart the temporal and spatial politics of a
modernizing legal regime. It is important to emphasize here that vernacular
capitalism’s market practices were exploitative, producing debt servitude among
lower castes, and fortified by uncompromising patriarchy and strict gender codes;
colonial law translated them as cultural practices first and foremost, a process that
reinforced and reproduced their hegemonies in the name of cultural protection.24
Indeed, the emergence of discourses of culture as politicized scripts, an effect of
the abstracting of the economy, reflects a historical situation in which law as
logos—the rule of law manifest in an obsessive Benthamite standardization of
market practice—confronted law as nomos, in its most situated sense as shifting
customary practices (practices that Hindu and Muslim legal traditions had
adjudicated with attention to the specificity of context). As many postcolonial
scholars have highlighted, the colonial legal regime codified shifting, locally
situated customary conventions into scripted logics of religious personal laws, thus
rendering formerly negotiable hierarchies and differences—themselves oppressive,
and so not to be celebrated—as rigid and fixed.25 In other words, colonial legal
pluralism evinced governmental imperatives to locate and classify communities,
rather than any benign interest in “noninterference” or promoting arenas of self24. These arguments are elaborated in detail across the two parts of BIRLA, supra note 2. Part
One maps law and jurisprudence, and Part Two focuses on vernacular capitalists subject-formation in
relation to legal regulation. For an overview of the theoretical and historiographical framework, see
that book’s introduction, BIRLA, supra note 2; see also RITU BIRLA, Capitalist Subjects in Transition, in
FROM THE COLONIAL TO THE POSTCOLONIAL 241–60 (Dipesh Chakrabarty et al. eds., 2007).
25. For foundational analyses of colonial law in India, see Bernard Cohn, Law and the Colonial
State, in COLONIALISM AND ITS FORMS OF KNOWLEDGE 57–75 (1996); see also Bernard Cohn, From
Indian Status to British Contract, in AN ANTHROPOLOGIST AMONG HISTORIANS AND OTHER ESSAYS
463–82 (1990).
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governance, as official policy would claim.26 My postcolonial analysis of market
governance highlights that the homogenization of localized conventions into
politicized scripts of “culture” was tied intimately to rewriting of the social as
market.27
To summarize, the history of colonial market governance illustrates many
key modern sovereign performatives of law.28 Law’s generative capacities to
produce temporal and social contexts through both sovereign commands and
citationality, its a posteriori production of origins as precedent, structure the colonial
story of the “disembedding” of the market. Again, coined in Polanyi’s canonical
text of economic sociology, the term “disembedding” marks the abstracting of the
“self-regulating market” from the density of social meanings, a process that
rendered “the market” a model for all social relations.29 At the same time, through
a postcolonial attention to the limits of law, I want to emphasize that the legal
acrobatics of market governance in India also evince the impossibility of such a
complete disembedding. In the following examples of colonial market governance,
the themes of convention, corporation, and currency mark such tensions between
forms of “embedded” social life in the discussion about vernacular kinship-based
mercantile conventions, and the modernizing impetus that abstracts the public
project of economy from the private realm of indigenous “culture.”
III. THE NONECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF POWER: LAW AND GOVERNMENTALITY
Foucault’s now well-known call for a “noneconomic analysis of power,”
which grounds his genealogy of governmentality, furthers the project of reading
the legal archive as problem of embeddedness, for it situates political liberalism’s
parameters of legal subjecthood and agency.30 Interested in exposing the
monopoly of an idea of exchange, contract, reciprocity, and remedy over the
concept of law, the “noneconomic analysis of power” informs the analytics of law
as economy and it is therefore worthwhile to draw the broad connections here.
In his Collège de France lectures that precede his theorizing of governmentality,
Foucault exposes two established scripts for the way power is configured, both of

26. The classic study of British colonial legal pluralism in this vein is MAHMOOD MAMDANI,
CITIZEN AND SUBJECT: CONTEMPORARY AFRICA AND THE LEGACY OF LATE COLONIALISM
(1996). On technologies of classification of communities and castes, see NICHOLAS DIRKS, CASTES
OF MIND (2001).
27. As such, colonial legal pluralism cannot be read as just the exercise of agency on the part
of colonized subjects; a postcolonial approach would promote problematizing their agency alongside
instrumentality in affirming new orderings of power.
28. For a discussion on performativity (rather than performance) and law, see Ritu Birla,
Performativity Between Logos and Nomos: Law, Temporality, and the ‘Non-Economic Analysis of Power’, 21
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 492 (2011).
29. See generally POLANYI, supra note 12.
30. Michel Foucault, Two Lectures, in POWER/KNOWLEDGE 89 (Colin Gordon ed., 1980);
Foucault, Governmentality, supra note 8 and FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF BIOPOLITICS, supra note 3.
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which he states suffer from an “economism in the theory of power.”31 In the first,
the juridical or liberal conception of political power, the model of sovereignty
codified by the philosophes of the eighteenth century:
[P]ower is taken to be a right, which one is able to possess like a
commodity, and which one can . . . transfer or alienate . . . through a legal
act or some act that establishes a right, such as takes place through
cession or contract . . . . This theoretical construction is essentially based
on the idea that the constitution of political power obeys the model of a
legal transaction involving a contractual type of exchange.32
The point here is that liberal democratic legal systems operate reductively by
posing power as a form of contractual exchange, enacted by an abstract legal
subject, rather than as a broad nexus running through the layers of subjectivity and
sociality. If the first script of economism focuses on exchange and circulation, the
second is also reductive, for it operates as a material-determinist Marxism, or an
“economic functionality of power” in which “the historical raison d’être of political
power and the principle of its concrete forms and actual functioning, is located in
the economy.”33 That is, “the economy,” understood and naturalized as an already
established thing, becomes the origin and explanation of all relations of power.
Law structures juridical notions of sovereignty in the first economistic
model, and is an instrument of economic functionality in the second. A
postcolonial approach to law as economy elaborates this critique of reductionist
accounts of power by thinking law in its wide range from convention, to custom,
to sovereign logic, and as site of subject-formation and subjection, thus mapping
both the installation of the absolute authority of legal and political models of
contract as well as their limits.34 At the same time, such an approach requires
problematizing the a priori status of “the economy” that Foucault, despite the
historicizing impetus of his analysis, seems to presuppose, and reproduce here. A
law-as-economy project would detail the relationship between law, rights, and
social relations of contract, and the production of “the economy” that law is either
meant to reflect (as in the “free market of ideas,” a term ubiquitous in the majority
opinion of the recent Supreme Court decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission35) or to protect us from (as in labor law).
Foucault’s 1978–79 lectures, one of which is the well-known essay
“Governmentality,” open such a project, for they elaborate and detail the ways in
31. Foucault, Two Lectures, supra note 30, at 88.
32. Id. I would note here that cession and contract are both addressed through the concept of
economy; conquest and contract, appropriation and exchange are posed along a continuum, a point
that would not have been lost on Macaulay.
33. Id. at 89.
34. Such project reads law on a register beyond the state, pushing the important empirical
work on “the contested historical movement from truly plural legal orders to state-dominated legal
orders. . . .” BENTON, supra note 13, at 28.
35. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 50 (2010).
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which “economy” comes to dominate as a discourse of governing, especially with
the modern emergence of political economy. Tracing the many meanings of
“government” in western tracts, the lectures address it not simply as the
administration of state, but as techniques of controlling the self, guiding the
family, managing the household (oikonomia), and as the art of governing political
subjects.36 For Foucault, modern liberal forms of governance have a strong
relation to the idea of economy in its most formal definition, rooted in the Greek
term oikonomia.37 This idea of economy as arranging and managing is revitalized
with the emergence of political economy as a knowledge form, which marks a
shift from “imposing law on men” to “disposing things” and using “laws
themselves as tactics to arrange things in such a way that . . . such and such ends
may be achieved.”38 As I mentioned earlier, “governmentality” is often used
loosely as a term for the nexus of knowledge/power, but here refers specifically to
the forms of governing introduced by political economy, a discourse that isolates
“the economy as a specific sector of reality” and also becomes the “science and
the technique of intervention . . . in that field of reality.”39
In particular, Foucault’s theorizing of conduct, the ground of law as nomos, is
relevant for a reading of the installation of principles of contract so ubiquitous in
the history of the colonial rule of law, for it presents a critique of the autonomous,
intending legal subject. In the 1978 Collège de France lectures, government is
analyzed as direction, arrangement, management (gérer), and as “conduite,” meaning
not only:
[T]he activity of directing, conducting, if you will, but equally the manner
in which one conducts oneself, the manner in which one lets oneself be
directed, the manner in which one is directed, and finally how one
comports oneself [on se trouve se comporter] under the effect of a directing or
conducting, which would be the acting out of the direction, or conduct.40
These slippages across the exercise of agency and ventriloquized
instrumentality—to direct, to let oneself be directed, to be directed and comport
oneself accordingly in the proper conduct—in sum, the “conduct of conduct,” are
pursued in a variety of historical contexts, from the Greek oikonomia to laissez36. See FOUCAULT, LA NAISSANCE DE LA BIOPOLITIQUE, supra note 3; FOUCAULT,
SÉCURITÉ, TERRITOIRE, POPULATION, supra note 8. The English translations are FOUCAULT, THE
BIRTH OF BIOPOLITICS, supra note 3, and FOUCAULT, SECURITY, TERRITORY, POPULATION, supra
note 8.
37. See Aristotle, supra note 16 book I, for the definition of oikonomia.
38. Foucault, supra note 8, at 95.
39. Id. at 102.
40. Translation mine. See FOUCAULT, SÉCURITÉ, TERRITOIRE, POPULATION, supra note 8, at
196–97, for the definition of conduct: “[C]e mot ‘conduite’ se réfère a deux choses. La conduite, c’est
bien l’activité qui consiste à conduire, la conduction si vous voulez, mais c’est également la manière
dont on se conduit, la manière dont on se laisse conduire, la manière dont on est conduit et dont,
finalement, on se trouve se comporter sous l’effet d’une conduite qui serait acte de conduite ou de
conduction.”
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faire’s manipulating, facilitating, enabling, and managing.41 It is in this vein that
Foucault contemplates “civil society as an arrangement of economic men,” or
what he calls “la technologie de la gouvernementalité libérale [the technology of liberal
governmentality].”42 In this formulation, economic man marks the site where
agency and instrumentality slip into each other, and where therefore one can
neither locate an autonomous subject with agency nor the stable a priori
intentionality that grounds the contractual principles and procedures of the legal
subject.
In India, colonial legal anxieties about vernacular capitalism exposed such an
interest in making such a civil society, composed of “economic men,” that is,
modern subjects whose agency is so directed or managed that there is no
distinction between being governed and exercising agency, evoking Macaulay’s
dreams. But the historical context of colonial liberalism, with which Foucault
unfortunately does not engage, also charts a different genealogy. Foucault offers a
rigorous critique of the a priori, intending individual subject, which is important
for thinking a colonial genealogy of liberal governmentality. At the same time, the
critique falls short, for the subjects of colonial market governance were cast legally
as both individual contracting actors and as anachronistic collective/cultural
agents.
IV. COMPANIES AND THE MONOPOLIZATION OF CORPORATE LIFE
As we know from Henry Sumner Maine’s Ancient Law, the problem of
corporate life—forms of collective association or what Weber called
“consociation”—dominated nineteenth- and early twentieth-century legal thinking
and was rooted in a colonial sociology of knowledge.43 Ancient Law, which
announced the master narrative of legal modernity as the shift from “status to
contract,” marked the kind of temporizing that enforced the modern authority of
contract, and the standardization of the distinction between public and private
law, both of which presuppose the individual person as a priori legal subject.44
Influenced by Maine, colonial jurists understood joint family organization in
nineteenth-century India as an ancient form of corporation.45 The difficulty with
the joint family, as with other such ancient forms in medieval Europe, was that, in
Maine’s words, “corporations never die”: they have a perpetual life, an extensive
41. See FOUCAULT, SÉCURITÉ, TERRITOIRE, POPULATION, supra note 8, at 360–61, on the
emergence of political economy and a new governmentality: “Il va falloir manipuler, il va falloir
susciter, il va falloir faciliter, il va falloir laisser faire, il va falloir autrement dit, gérer et non plus
réglementer.” See also Gordon, Governmental Rationality, supra note 3, at 17–20.
42. Id. at 23; MICHEL FOUCAULT, Lecture, 1 April 1979, in LA NAISSANCE DE LA
BIOPOLITIQUE, supra note 3, at 300.
43. MAITLAND, supra note 23.
44. Id. at 164.
45. The joint family form in India was a collective association that did not presuppose
individual shares of property, but that was nevertheless translated legally as a “coparcenary.”
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temporal negotiability that renders it impossible to know when they begin and
when they end.46 The commercial joint family firm in India, known in colonial law
by the term “Hindu Undivided Family,” challenged British legislators and jurists in
this way, posing a problem of extensive temporal negotiability, and indeed an
extensive negotiability between the symbolic value of kinship, caste and lineage,
and the arrangements and capital flows of commerce and finance.
The majority of vernacular firms were regulated by the Hindu Law of
Mitakshara, the personal law system which gave sons rights in the family property,
including the capital of the firm, at birth.47 Moreover, credit and what economic
historians have called “commercial trust” could be extended to kinship relations
that could be linked back through a common male ancestor as many as seven
generations. Connections across time were complemented by connections across
space: the vernacular notion of “family” extended beyond just the household and
encompassed a variety of patriarchal relations. The commercial joint family
household—father, wife, sons and their wives, and unmarried daughters—existed
within a much broader context, the nexus of extended relations harnessed by the
firm. These networks were constituted spatially, across villages, bazaars, and even
global regions. Lines of descent called gotres arranged exogamous clans within a
particular endogamous caste, and constituted yet another barometer for degrees of
affinity.48 This extensive negotiability was a marker of forms and conventions of
“embedded” social life that we can only understand as Gemeinschaft (community),
after Gesellschaft (society grounded in contract), and law’s processes of
“disembedding” have been initiated. I draw attention to Maine’s central place in
colonial knowledge on India to highlight the role of legal thought and its forms of
temporizing in the modern monopoly of the very idea of the corporate, which
understands it through contractual models and as either market-based (as in the
limited liability corporation, and even more colloquially, via the logo “inc.”) or
state-based (as in municipal corporation).
The story of the establishment of The Indian Companies Act of 1882 is a
strong example of this process. Establishing the limited liability joint-stock as the
model for commercial organization, the act was a fine-tuning of an earlier statute
of 1866 and was instituted after the boom and bust of the cotton market in
western India in the 1870s, following the U.S. Civil War. In this volatile market
climate, British merchants launched new companies at an accelerated rate, drew
investments from native shareholders, and then defrauded them, absconding with
their investments. The hundreds of pages of debates surrounding the act evince a

46. Id. at 135.
47. For the most influential British translation of the Mitakshara, see H.T. COLEBROOKE,
THE LAW OF INHERITANCE ACCORDING TO THE MITACSHARA (Thacker Spink & Co. 1869).
48. For more on kinship arrangements of commerce, see BIRLA, supra note 2, Introduction.
See also C.A. BAYLY, RULERS, TOWNSMEN AND BAZAARS (1983) and DAVID RUDNER, CASTE AND
CAPITALISM IN COLONIAL INDIA: THE NATTUKOTTAI CHETTIARS (1994).
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public discrediting of British-run joint-stocks, and an extensive public discussion
of corruption, a genealogy that we might date back to the trial of Warren Hastings,
the first Governor-General of the East India Company. As one officially solicited
“native” opinion asserted, these newly hatched joint-stocks were “huge
superstructures of fraud, erected to inveigle the unwary and imprudent.”49 And
despite this exposé of limited liability as a masquerade for corrupt practices, the
debate resulted in new legislation, offering a pumped-up version of limited
liability, with strict codes for memoranda of association, official registration, and
the regulation of bankruptcy. It replicated earlier British statutes and enforced the
corporation as a public legal person, a contractual model for what was called the
“the healthy and useful employment of capital” and equally as significantly, for
civic association.
The intensity of the discussion over principles of corporate association
reflects the extent to which forms of capitalist economic organization informed
visions of modern social association in this period. The Acting Registrar of JointStock Companies at Bombay, the eye of the storm, for example, insisted that:
[T]he evils incidental to limited liability have been exaggerated in Bombay
by peculiarities in Native character. . . . The mass of Native shareholders,
profoundly ignorant, and placing blind confidence in the new discovery
in “finance” placed no watch on their Directors and Managers. The latter
only wanted to profit from the sale of shares, and cared nothing for the
regular transaction of business. The shareholders have now changed the
blindness of confidence for the blindness of terror, and it appears that
they are generally quite ready to get out of the concern at any cost
without calling the responsible parties to account.50
Reiterating long-held tropes about the submissive nature of the native
population, the Registrar’s opinion posed habits of public civic association—the
responsibility of exercising rights, rather than obeying a despot or director—as
necessary conventions for the “healthy and useful employment of capital.” An
economic organization of the social, in other words, was to convey modern habits
of rights, part of a civilizing mission’s mantra of “moral and material progress.”
At the same time, the affirmation of limited liability threw the organization
and practices of kinship-based commerce into question. The figure of the
indigenous merchant loomed large in the debates, strangely not as facilitator of
capital, but as a serious problem, a problem of personalized exchange antithetical
to new legal procedures. The major issue was whether the standardized
procedures of the Act applied at all to indigenous kinship-based firms: could these
even be conceived as public corporations, or at the very least as contractual
partnerships? If so, it was argued, the firm should come under the purview of the
Act. Or was the firm first and foremost a family? In this case, it would have to be
49.
50.

BIRLA, supra note 2, at 45.
BIRLA, supra note 2, at 42–43.
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regulated by the Hindu or Muslim personal law that governed the so-called private
realm of indigenous “culture”—matters of caste, inheritance, and religion. Again,
it is important to remember here that by this time, the project of “cultural
preservation” was official policy, enforced through the codification and
application of the personal law.
The Companies Act did not, as might be expected in an easy reading of
colonial disciplinary practices, make indigenous firms directly subject to its
regulations. Rather, it demanded that they be regulated by the Hindu or Muslim
personal law governing families and religio-cultural practice. In short, vernacular
capitalism was governed first and foremost as cultural, rather than as economic
mechanism. That is, despite the universally acknowledged role of vernacular
capitalists as key economic middlemen, colonial law institutionalized a disjuncture
between economy, a public and ethical project, and culture, a private one. The
Companies Act thus exposes a key technique of colonial liberal governmentality—
the production of economy and culture as distinct and separate spheres—one I
argue ultimately espoused by indigenous capitalists themselves. This was manifest
especially by the 1920s, when capitalist groups who had previously referred to
their practices as a kind of lex mercatoria, a nomos or way of conducting business,
began to recode them as legally protected cultural customs, entering for example
heated public discussions on protecting the ancient authority of the Hindu joint
family.51 New discourses on the market coded the embedded practices of local
capitalisms as cultural formations, bound to age-old tradition. The colonial legal
installation of the social as market, through a contractual politics of Gesellschaft,
produced a world of Gemeinschaft as its effect, promoted by colonial legal
pluralism’s culturalist scripts.
V. CONVENTION, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, AND THE LEX MERCATORIA
There are many rich stories that I could offer that further demonstrate the
coding of the joint family firm as an ancient form of corporation, lost in tradition
and regulated by custom, that is, the static norms of religio-cultural ritual. The
jurisprudential acrobatics that instituted the law against perpetuities and mortmain
in India is such a story. Another is the story of criminal law and its new forms of
economic surveillance, manifest in the coding of kinship-based speculative and
futures trading practices as gambling at a time when similar practices were being
legitimized in stock and commodities exchanges in Britain and the United States
especially.52 To summarize, the legal installation of “the economy” produced a
distinction between economy, a public project, and culture, the realm of “ancient”
and customary forms corporate life like the “Hindu Undivided Family.” To read
law as economy, I want to emphasize, would require attention to the relationship

51.
52.

See BIRLA, supra note 2, at Part II, “Negotiating Subjects.”
See BIRLA, supra note 2, at ch. 2–4.
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between the economic coding of the social and production of “culture” as its
effect, as a politicized name for difference, and site for commodification. The
colonial rewriting of the social as market and its culturalist effects—the writing
over of the vast range of corporate life and socialities in this moment of colonial
liberalism—also opens a law as economy approach to contemporary neoliberal
governmentalities, which demand, for example, reading new configurations of the
legal domain: law on finance alongside international law, copyright law and
cultural rights, and corporate law alongside constitutional issues of free speech.
At the same time, another important moment in this period of commercial
and financial standardization challenged the temporizing of the joint family firm as
an instrument of ancient custom, of an irrational “habituation to a regularity of life
that has engraved itself as custom,” to borrow a phrase from Weber’s Economy and
Society.53 Almost contemporaneous with the Indian Companies Act, the Negotiable
Instruments Act of 1881 grappled with what colonial jurists had begun to call the
“native” lex mercatoria. I will only be able to gesture here to how a fuller analysis of
the discourse on the lex mercatoria in India would elaborate some of the more
recent interest in this liminal legal realm, which in its critical gestures seeks to
chart a genealogy that “transcends the distinction between state and non-state
laws” to conceptualize new legal fields in globalization.54 But for the moment, I
would like to foreground a key feature of the debates around the Indian
Negotiable Instruments Act, once again, the problem of the joint family firm, and
discourses on the temporality of vernacular conventions.
Indigenous or vernacular systems of credit in particular drew legislators’
attention as British joint-stock banks flourished beginning in the mid-nineteenth
century, marking the institutionalization of the British banking sector in the
subcontinent. British banks depended on vernacular merchants and their vast
access to credit in the bazaars across India, and vernacular capitalism’s investment
in the financing of colonial commodity production tied them to sources of British
financing. The indigenous “unorganized” banking sector had varied
“personalized” and multiregional conventions for borrowing, lending, and
investing, secured by extended ties of kinship, in which negotiable instruments
could be endorsed and reendorsed many times; they sustained a very extensive
negotiability. These conventions, and their variability, posed problems for
legislation aimed at rationalizing and facilitating flows of credit and forms of paper
currency.55 As early as 1866, the first Indian Law Commission, guided by Henry
Sumner Maine and James Fitzjames Stephen, had introduced the question of
standardized rules for negotiable instruments. Intended to be one of the chapters
of the Indian Civil Code, an inaugural bill on the subject was introduced in 1867,
53. WEBER, supra note 17, at 312.
54. Michaels, supra note 19, at 468.
55. On the “unorganized” banking sector, see Amiya K. Bagchi, Transition from Indian to British
Indian Systems, 3 MODERN ASIAN STUDIES, 501, 501–19 (1985).
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and referred to a Select Committee. The mercantile members of the Legislative
Council, all representatives of British trading interests, had unanimously objected
to the bill because of its numerous deviations from English law. On the other
hand, other members had strongly criticized it for not including a clause saving the
customs of native merchants. From the bill’s inception, then, the question of
preserving indigenous customs, and so sustaining the official policy of
“noninterference” in native culture, conflicted with arguments for their
assimilation into British legal models.56
The debate, which continued for over a decade, was driven by the
ambiguous place within the Anglo-Indian legal system of what jurists called the
“native law merchant,” for this legal arena did not fall under the purview of
personal law. The final act of 1881 did include a “local usages” exception, but one
that ingeniously opened a space for their assimilation to models of contract
already codified by the Indian Contract Act of 1872. It stated that in order to
“facilitate the assimilation of the practice of Native shroffs [bankers] to that of
European merchants,” the act would extend:
[T]o the whole of British India; but nothing herein . . . affects any local
usage relating to any instrument in an oriental language: Provided that
such usage may be excluded by any words in the body of the instrument
which indicate an intention that the legal relations of the parties thereto
shall be governed by this Act.57
Local usages could thus be overruled if vernacular negotiable instruments
were written to accommodate the practices of British bankers and merchants.
While in theory not directly affecting relations among indigenous merchants, this
provision reflected the de facto governmental installation of a new market terrain,
the concomitant delegitimizing of bazaar practices and the accelerated and more
extensive transactions between British and indigenous commerce conducted
through joint-stock banks. The Select Committee on the bill in 1879 defended the
new provision as one which would not “stereotype and perpetuate these
[indigenous] usages,” but rather “induce the Native mercantile community
gradually to discard them for the corresponding rules contained in the Bill.”
Seeking to transform mercantile convention while dissimulating laissez-faire, the
Committee argued that “the desirable uniformity of mercantile usage will thus be
brought about without any risk of causing hardship to Native bankers and
merchants.” It delivered evidence offered by the British joint-stock Bank of
56. It is important to note that a wide range of literature in colonial and South Asian studies
has emphasized that this official policy of “noninterference” was grounded on a very substantive
interference: the selective translation and construction of personal law as code for managing native
customs and practices. For a foundational text in this vein, see Bernard Cohn, Law and the Colonial
State, supra note 25.
57. KRISHNAMACHARI BHASHYAM & KAKKUNJE YEGNANARAYANA ADIGA, THE
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT 10 (Bharat Law House 16th ed. 1997); see also BIRLA, supra note 2,
at ch. 1.
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Bengal, “that the native usages as to negotiable paper have of recent years been
greatly changing, and that the tendency is to assimilate them more and more to the
European custom.”58
These statements, expressing an interest in not causing hardship and in
simply enabling new options, seem to resonate with the legally disciplined
managerial language ubiquitous in colloquial forms of neoliberal governing today:
rules are instituted, they draw boundaries and delineate terrains of agency, but are
sold as simply opening a new kind of choice. To give a familiar example, an airline
that no longer provides meal service will tell its travelers they have a range of
choices for onboard snacks (at a small cost). (That we choose to buy a packet of
trail mix cannot be celebrated as unmediated agency.) Coding “European custom”
as standard and current, these strategies also evoke Macaulay’s vision of wellgoverned subjects whose located agency slips into instrumentality for a larger
agency, the market. Said differently, the standardization represented by the
Negotiable Instruments Act presented itself as the logical extension of indigenous
mercantile conventions, even as it reflected the very institutionalization of a new
terrain—the public space of economy, inscribed by the new and restricted spatial
and temporal negotiability of contract law. Here, colonial legislators reproduced
romanticism about the medieval and early modern lex mercatoria as an autonomous
space, even as they inscribed the very rules for its legibility. Moreover, the act
temporized indigenous convention in a radically new way. The juridical criterion
for defining an indigenous customary convention, in line with the colonial liberal
project of cultural preservation, was its ancient status and operation since “time
immemorial.” But in the case of negotiable instruments, mercantile convention
was recognized to be the most current practice. Citing a 1902 judgment, a
canonical twentieth-century Indian legal digest thus explained that in adjudicating
negotiable instruments cases, the ancient status of a custom would not have to be
“insisted upon with the same strictness as in other cases, for the very fact that the
ways of commerce have so widened . . . has led inevitably to new customs and
usages being more speedily devised, more speedily adopted, and more speedily
recognized, than in the past.”59 If in other cases, vernacular conventions were
coded as ancient custom, here, in the name of formalizing currency, they were
read literally, as what is current, and so, performing a perfect meeting of
temporality and embodiment, as currency itself. Said differently, the statute and
jurisprudence on negotiable instruments here expose the sovereign performatives
of law as economy: the ways in which modern economic visions organize the
social and its temporalities, colonizing the present and coding the past as
“culture.” The opposing temporalities ascribed to vernacular mercantile practice—
58. See Report of the Select Committee on the Negotiable Instruments Act, published in the
Gazette of India, 1879, v. 75, cited in THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT 1881, 17–18.
59. BHASHYAM & ADIGA, supra note 57, at 19. The case referred to here is Edelstein v. Shuler
and Co. (1902) 2 Kings Bench 144.
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ancientness and ever-present currency—also indicate both the outside limits of
law and its very inside. Law in its juristic form, as a self-referential system and
logic, or logos, cannot catch either that which comes from “time immemorial” or
that which is ever-shifting. These categories, both ancient custom and uncatchable
currency, mark the range of law as nomos.
VI. LAW INSIDE/OUTSIDE ECONOMY
Reading law as economy recodes the project of time management espoused
by the modern discipline of economics; it does so by turning to the temporalities
of governing and managing. Attention to the problem of embeddedness, or the
limits of law, opens a postcolonial project of mapping the temporal politics of
legal systems: there are spaces and practices that law’s sovereignty, whether
articulated as imperial dictum or as the procedures of civil law, cannot catch. Thus
for example, as I’ve pointed to here, the logic of British colonial liberalism, which
sought to demarcate realms for the autonomy of native culture as ancient
authority, can be rethought as part of a new mapping of community, corporate
life, and the social itself. The range of temporal plays manifest in the colonial legal
dynamics I’ve addressed here points to the insides that are the outsides of formal
legal systems.
The formulation “law as economy” pushes the legal historian to attend to
law at once as an inside and an outside, for as I mentioned earlier, law is at the
heart of economy as nomos, and economy therefore is itself a concept of law.
Economy as an idea conveys law’s performativity, for the practice of economy
enacts law through arranging, managing, and governing. As nomos or convention,
economy marks a set of actions that speak, as distinct from the more familiar
speech that acts, or the speech-act, the logos (the word and system) that marks the
autonomous performatives of sovereignty, ethical or political. A significant task of
legal history and theory together is to detail, as I’ve highlighted through some
examples from the colonial legal terrain in India, the workings of the context and
system-producing incarnation of law (logos), alongside those of nomos or
convention, the sign of an always-already context, and so its impossibility.
Such moves also pose questions for historically narrating law and its
contexts. If the work of legal history, particularly in the social history of law, has
been directed fruitfully at destabilizing legal navel-gazing by weaving the
mechanics of law into empirical historical contexts, it may also try to push legal
history beyond this important role as empirical mapping of the circuits of law’s
agency and the legal agency of subjects, into critical practice itself.60 In the
historical moment I’ve addressed in this essay, the question in this vein would be:
how can we unpack both the idea of the self-regulating power of law and the free

60. Such a critical practice evokes Gayatri Spivak’s approach to history and alterity in SPIVAK,
supra note 10, as well as a Nietzschean approach to critical history.
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market? That is, a critical analysis of colonial market governance does not just
mean mapping law’s sites of regulation and demonstrating the ways in which
vernacular capitalists resisted new legal measures, or deployed them, but also
addressing the historical production of the market as ethical and political model
for self-regulation, that is auto-nomos, or autonomy, and its appearance and
abstraction as an a priori logos. Calling legal history to attend to historicity, and so
to embodied and situated practices, such a method details the legal translation and
mistranslation of their sites of agency, translations into forms of legal
incorporation and instruments of a disembodied invisible hand.
Moving beyond the logics of law, and the ways in which those logics are
contested and deployed by legal actors, legal history as critical practice would thus
confront the problem of the autonomous subject exercising intentioned agency.
To elaborate briefly in closing on the examples given earlier, the colonial legal
discourse on kinship-based mercantile organization poses this challenge saliently.
One key example is nineteenth-century colonial jurisprudence on indigenous
endowments gifted for social welfare.61 Vernacular capitalists would establish
institutions for social welfare such as temples, schools, rest houses for travelers, all
of which were consecrated to deities. These were organizations that produced
social capital and affirmed the respectability, and so the credit, of kinship-based
firms. The difficulty for jurists was that in vernacular conventions, income derived
from such properties could revert back to the firm, to defray debt, or to provide
for the welfare of aging family members for example. Income regained in time
would then be redirected to the endowment. Such oscillations performed the
extensive negotiability across social capital and the material flows of credit, as well
as across time itself, and across the colonial categories of public and private, that
characterized vernacular commercial practices. Anglo-Indian jurisprudence on
trusts sought to restrict this negotiability, and sought to establish an a priori
intentionality for the purpose of such endowments, one that would regulate the
endowment as a contract made in perpetuity, and so confirm the principle of
mortmain as grounding legal category for charitable trusts. These concerns were
manifest in a series of late nineteenth-century Bombay and Calcutta High Court
cases on religious endowments, in which judges interpreted case law on temple
management to argue that the deity was a legal subject. Extending this logic to case law
on endowments for social welfare that were consecrated to deities, new precedents
established that these were gifts given to the deity as legal beneficiary, so that no
income could revert back to families, as the rights of the beneficiary confirmed
that the purpose of the endowment was to exist in perpetuity. This fantastic turn
of legal idolatry, which ushered in the sovereign translation of customary
endowment as legal trust, exposes modern law’s investment in an autonomous
subject: the legal rights of the deity overrode the situated contexts of gift giving,

61.

For a detailed reading of this jurisprudence with case law, see BIRLA, supra note 2, at ch. 2.
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now to be unmediated by social negotiations.
Reflecting a rewriting of the social as an arrangement of a priori individuals,
the deity as legal subject is a potent figuration of the divine performative of
sovereignty on the one hand, and on the other, the ventriloquism of “speaking”
subjects that is now a well-established intervention of postcolonial theory.62 Such
stories of the power of legal fictions push legal history to move beyond the
recounting of legal orders, however plural, to the mechanics of law as ground for
subjectivity and agency, the slippery relationship of agency and instrumentality,
and the dissimulation of ethico-political autonomy. “Law as economy” is just one
formulation in such a project, though perhaps one of the most potent given the
history and contemporary ubiquity of the economic subject staged globally as
agent of unmediated choice, and to echo Macaulay, civilization.

62. Gayatri Spivak’s theorizing of subjectivity and agency remains the critical model here. See
especially her revision of her famous essay Can the Subaltern Speak in SPIVAK, supra note 10, at 312–
421. For a recent volume elaborating the implications of her intervention, see GAYATRI
CHAKRAVORTY SPIVAK, CAN THE SUBALTERN SPEAK: REFLECTIONS ON THE HISTORY OF AN
IDEA (Rosalind Morris ed., 2010).

